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CROSS-RETALIATION IN THE WTO:
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA'S PROPOSED
REMEDY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
IN AN ONLINE GAMBLING DISPUTE
Clint Bodien*
I. INTRODUCTION
N 2003, the small country of Antigua and Barbuda staked its claim in
the only World Trade Organization (WTO) case instituted by a Car-
ibbean nation, a case called "United States-Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services." 1 The laws re-
garding the legality of online gambling were so unclear in the United
States that the online casinos moved offshore to welcoming destinations
such as Antigua and Barbuda.2 The small country filed its claim with the
WTO because it felt that U.S. laws threatened free flow of online gam-
bling services to the United States.3
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
In March 2003, the Caribbean nation of Antigua and Barbuda (Anti-
gua) requested consultations from the United States, claiming that US.
federal, state, and local measures on gambling violate U.S. specific com-
mitments under the General Agreement on Trade of Services (GATS)
and several GATS articles.4 Antigua claimed the violation occurred be-
cause of laws that prevented operators of online gambling casinos from
offering their services in the United States.5 The United States defended
the claim by arguing that online gambling did not fall within the specific
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1. Lillian Crawford-Abbensetts et al., The Caribbean, 41 INT'L LAW. 765, 770-72
(2006).
2. Michael Grunfeld, Don't Bet on the United States' Internet Gambling Laws: The
Tension Between Internet Gambling Legislation and World Trade Organization
Commitments, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 439, 480 (2007).
3. Id. at 480-81.
4. Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, United States-Measures Af-
fecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 1 4, WT/DS285/
1 - S/L/110 (Mar. 27, 2003).
5. Id. 91 3.
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GATS commitment and that even if it did, the ban on online gambling
was justified under article XIV of the GATS, which provided an excep-
tion to the commitment.6 Upon Antigua's request, the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) convened a panel to investigate the matter in 2003,
and the panel issued a panel report in November 2004.
7
The panel report concluded that the U.S. GATS schedule included spe-
cific commitments on gambling and betting services within the scope of
"other recreational services (except sporting)."'8 The report further con-
cluded that the United States, via three federal acts, violated article XVI
(Market Access) of the GATS by prohibiting cross-border supply where
specific commitments had been undertaken. 9 Market access requires that
all countries accord treatment to all other member countries no less
favorable than what is specified in its schedule, and if cross-border move-
ment of capital is an essential part of the service, it must be allowed. 10
Regarding the U.S. defense, the Panel ruled that the U.S. laws were not
justified under the GATS article XIV exception allowing a country to
adopt measures when "necessary to protect public morals and/or public
order."' 1I While the Panel did find that the U.S. measures were designed
"to protect public morals and/or to maintain public order" within the
meaning of the article XIV(a) exception of the GATS, the Panel further
found that the measures in question had a significant impact on trade and
thus concluded that consultations and negotiations with Antigua were
reasonable alternatives, which forbade the laws from qualifying as "nec-
essary."'12 Even if the U.S. federal laws were reasonably considered "in-
dispensable" by the United States, the United States did not show that
the laws fell within the article XIV public morals exception because they
did not show that the laws were "necessary" because the United States
was obliged to explore alternatives before taking a WTO-inconsistent
measure. 13 Taking the multifaceted decision as a whole, the ruling came
down in favor of Antigua on their complaint that U.S. laws violated trade
provisions.
The United States appealed the panel report in January 2005, followed
shortly by Antigua's appeals of certain issues, and the WTO's Appellate
Body (AB) issued a report in April 2005.14 The AB upheld the Panel's
finding that the United States did not exclude gambling and betting ser-
6. Gary Hufbauer & Sherry Stephenson, Services Trade: Past Liberalization and Fu-
ture Challenges, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 605, 616 (2007).
7. Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gam-
bling and Betting Services, 1.2, 1.12, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).
8. Id. 1 6.134.
9. Id. 6.421.
10. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, art. 16, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 at 1168, 1179 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Final Act].
11. Panel Report, supra note 7, 1 6.535.
12. Id. T 6.487, 6.528, 6.533.
13. Id. 91 6.534-.535.
14. Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Sup-
ply of Gambling and Betting Services, 91 1, 7, WTIDS285/ABIR (Apr. 7, 2005).
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vices from its GATS specific commitments. 15 Further, the AB upheld the
finding of the Panel that the United States violated article XVI of the
GATS (Market Access). 16 The AB agreed with the Panel to interpret the
three U.S. federal laws at issue, the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the
Illegal Gambling Business Act (IGBA), to prohibit the cross-border sup-
ply of internet gambling services, thereby creating a zero quota that was
prohibited by the Market Access article.17 But, Antigua failed to make
out a prima facie case on similar state laws that Antigua had claimed also
violated the article.18
While upholding the Panel's finding that the U.S. laws were enacted to
regulate public morals, the AB diverted from the Panel in holding that
the United States did in fact make out a prima facie case that the laws
were also necessary and that Antigua failed to show reasonable alterna-
tives which would render the laws unnecessary.' 9 But, because article
XIV of the GATS also specifies that the chapeau of the article does not
cover measures that constitute "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries," in light of a fourth federal law called the Interstate
Horseracing Act (IHA), the United States did not show that its measures
applied equally to both foreign and domestic suppliers of remote gam-
bling services. 20 As passed, the IHA allowed domestic suppliers to take
bids on certain events, while forbidding foreign suppliers to do the
same.2' The Act may have constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable dis-
crimination, and the AB asserted that the United States failed to estab-
lish that the IHA did not change the scope of the three previously
mentioned statutes. 22
The United States was given approximately one year for implementa-
tion of the measures by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which
adopted the AB and Panel reports in April 2005.23 In April 2006, the
United States promulgated an implementation status report in which it
claimed that it was in compliance with the WTO rulings because the IHA
did not amend the existing criminal statutes which prohibited the inter-
state transmission of bets or wagers, and therefore the U.S. law did not
arbitrarily discriminate against foreign online casinos.2 4 Antigua thought





19. Appellate Body Report, supra note 14, 1 326.
20. Id. 1 372; Final Act, supra note 10, at 1177.
21. Interstate Horseracing Act § 3004, 15 U.S.C.A. § 3004 (West 2007).
22. Appellate Body Report, supra note 14, 372.
23. Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, United States-Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 1 68, WT/DS285/13 (Aug.
19, 2005).
24. Status Report by the United States: Addendum, United States-Measures Affect-
ing the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, $ 3-4, WT/DS285/
15/Add.1 (Apr. 11, 2006).
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United States.25 One month later, in July 2006, Antigua sought a compli-
ance panel under article 21.5 of the WTO's Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement
Understanding, or DSU). 26
In March 2007, the Article 21.5 panel promulgated a report finding that
the United States was not in compliance with the earlier WTO proceed-
ings.27 This finding led to the proposed remedy that is potentially
groundbreaking in this case. Antigua asked the DSB to suspend the ap-
plication to the United States of concessions or obligations under the
GATS and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) agreements in the annual amount of $3.443 billion, an enforce-
ment countermeasure under article 22.2.28 If granted the remedy it seeks,
Antigua would violate U.S. intellectual property rights in an unprece-
dented enforcement of a trade remedy designed to put small countries on
a more equal footing with large countries.
In December 2007, the WTO issued an arbitration report on the matter
in which it made findings on two distinct challenges by the United States:
the level of suspension that Antigua sought ($3.443 billion) and the
choice of proposed sectors in which Antigua would carry out the cross
retaliation. 29 The arbitration report found that the United States could
have complied with the WTO rulings by opening foreign access to remote
gambling on horseracing alone. 30 In light of the lost profits from gam-
bling solely on horseracing, the arbitration found that Antigua's measure
of damages was not $3.443 billion, but rather only $21 million.31 But, the
arbitration report did sanction Antigua's determination that it would not
be practicable or effective to suspend obligations solely under GATS, and
that Antigua therefore may seek authorization from the DSB to cross-
retaliate.32 While the arbitration award drastically reduced the amount of
damages, it was another step towards Antigua being awarded the use of
the remedy of cross-retaliation.
25. Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda, United States-
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 1,
WT/DS285/17 (June 12, 2006).
26. Id.
27. Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda: Report of the
Panel, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services 7.1, WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30, 2007).
28. Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Article 22.2 of the DSU, United States-
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, I
3-4, WT/DS285/22 (June 22, 2007).
29. Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Bet-
ting Services, 1 2.2, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007).
30. Id. 3.58.
31. Id. 3.189.
32. Id. T 6.1.
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III. THE REMEDY: CROSS-RETALIATION
A. HISTORY OF THE REMEDY AND PRIOR IMPLICATIONS: ECUADOR
Article 22.2 of the DSU allows for suspension of obligations to another
country in limited circumstances. 33 The remedy of cross-retaliation under
article 22.2 of the DSU has only been granted one time in the WTO's
history, but has never been exercised. 34 In the EU-Ecuador bananas
case, Ecuador was granted the remedy of violating intellectual property
rights, but never employed the measure, settling the case instead.35
B. MECHANICS OF THE REMEDY: DSU PROVISIONS
Article 22.4 of the DSU requires that the level of suspension of obliga-
tions authorized must be equivalent to the level of impairment by the
infracting country, i.e. that the retribution must be proportionate to the
initial harm.36 Important to note is that the essence of the remedy is the
goal of forcing the offending country to suspend its illicit act. 37 A country
that is out of compliance with the WTO agreement has the obligation to
come into compliance prospectively without having to remedy retroac-
tively the harm already perpetrated-here, the United States would be
obliged to come into compliance with the WTO agreement but would not
be obliged to repay Antigua for past harm.38
Multilateral trade agreements are categorized into three distinct parts
of Annex 1 to the WTO Agreement. 39 Essentially, these three parts can
be understood as: 1) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT 1994) and agreements on trade in goods, 2) the GATS agreement
on trade in services, and 3) the TRIPS agreement on intellectual property
rights.40 The agreements are then further subdivided into sectors within
each agreement. 41 Under article 22.3 of the DSU, the complaining party
should first seek to suspend obligations within the same sector as the vio-
lating party.4 2 Thus, in the case at hand, Antigua would first look toward
suspending obligations to the United States within the same agreement,
GATS, and within the same sector as the schedule commitment, "other
33. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
art. 22.2, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1239 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
34. Gary Rivlin, Gambling Dispute With a Tiny Country Puts U.S. in a Bind, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2007, at C1.
35. Gary Hufbauer & Sherry Stephenson, supra note 6, at 617.
36. DSU art. 22.4, supra note 33, at 1240.
37. Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules Through Nego-
tiations and Sanctions: The Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dispute
Settlement System, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 153, 169 (2007).
38. Id.
39. Thomas Sebastian, World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of
Proportionality: Equivalence and Appropriateness, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 337, 341
(2007).
40. Id. at 382.
41. Id.
42. DSU art. 22.3(a), supra note 33, at 1239.
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recreational services (except sporting)," is classified. 43 If the complaining
country finds it "not practicable or effective" to impose sanctions within
the same trade sector in which the violation occurred, then the country
may suspend obligations in a different sector within the same agreement.
Thus, Antigua would next look to suspending different obligations to-
ward the United States that are still within the GATS agreement, but
within a different sector than that in which the gambling violation oc-
curred.44 But, the level of suspension of obligations here still must be
equivalent to the level of impairment by the United States even though in
a different sector.45
Finally, if the complainant again finds it "not practicable or effective"
to impose sanctions, even within a different sector of the same agree-
ment, the country may suspend obligations in a different agreement. 46
Antigua's proposed remedy falls within this final category. Even though
the violation occurred under the GATS agreement for trade in goods,
Antigua has proposed to suspend obligations to the United States under
the TRIPS agreement by violating U.S. intellectual property rights.47
This remedy is commonly known as "cross-retaliation. ' 48
C. BASIS FOR THE REMEDY
The WTO provides three main justifications for allowing cross-retalia-
tion as a remedy for an aggrieved party under the agreements.4 9 First,
developing countries do not always import goods and services in suffi-
cient quantities to justify suspension of obligations within the same sector
as the sector in which the violation took place, so the complainant may
have no equivalent level of recourse within the same sector or agreement
that the violation took place.50 In this case, Antigua may not import ser-
vices within the sector to the same extent that they are claiming the
United States has prohibited importation of their recreational services. 51
As such, were Antigua to suspend obligations to the United States in the
same sector, the country would probably not achieve a level of recourse
equivalent to the level of harm done.52
The second justification given by the WTO for allowing cross-retalia-
tion is that some bilateral trade relationships may be asymmetrical, so
that the good or service is relatively important to the complainant while
43. Panel Report, supra note 7, 6.134.
44. DSU art. 22.3(b), supra note 33, at 1239.
45. DSU art. 22.4, supra note 33, at 1240.
46. DSU art. 22.3(c), supra note 33, at 1239.
47. Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Article 22.2 of the DSU, supra note 28, $ 3.
48. WTO.org, The Process - Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case: 6.10
Countermeasures by the Prevailing Member (Suspension of Obligations),$ 10,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/disp-settlement cbt-e/c6slOpl-e.htm
(last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
49. Id. 1 11.
50. Id.
51. Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Article 22.2 of the DSU, supra note 28, $ 11.
52. Id.
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remaining relatively unimportant for the violating party. 53 Here again,
online gambling is relatively important to the economy of Antigua.54 On-
line gambling is the second largest income-producing industry for the
country behind tourism.55 But, Antigua argues that ceasing all trade with
the United States, $180 million annually, would have no impact on the
U.S. economy. 56 Additionally, U.S. consumers make up a large part of
the online gambling market, worth $15.5 billion.57 The relationship is ob-
viously skewed such that the United States may easily absorb the blow
sustained by GATS trade sanctions against it in Antigua, while Antigua
suffered a major loss by the alleged violation committed by the United
States. In order to put Antigua on a level playing field with more power-
ful countries like the United States, the idea is that the WTO must allow
Antigua to suspend its obligations to the United States in a sector and
agreement outside of that violated in order to inflict real sanctions on the
United States in proportion to the harm done to Antigua.58
Finally, the WTO posits that it may be "economically unaffordable" for
the developing country to impose trade barriers against imports under
the GATS or GATT 1994 because of a significantly reduced supply and
increase of the price of the imports upon which the complainant's inhabi-
tants rely.59 Here again, the WTO allows cross-retaliation in order to
level the playing field between developing and economically powerful
countries.60 While the trade sanctions against foreign countries may not
have hurt the United States, if Antigua likewise erected trade barriers
under the GATS, the economy of the small country may suffer severely.
So. the WTO allows cross-retaliation in order to offer an alternative to
self-destructive trade sanctions in certain sectors for small and developing
countries. The idea for Antigua is that while a restriction on services in
the same sector as online gambling may not even get the attention of
decision-makers in Washington, if the country is allowed to violate U.S.
intellectual property rights, then Hollywood and software companies may
lobby politicians in Washington to make a change to the laws regarding
the IHA, among others.61
53. WTO.org, The Process - Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case, supra
note 48, 11.
54. Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Article 22.2 of the DSU, supra note 28, 11.
55. Sallie James, U.S. Response to Gambling Dispute Reveals Weak Hand, Center for
Trade Policy Studies-Free Trade Bulletin No. 24, 2 (2006), available at http://
www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FFB-024.pdf.
56. Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Article 22.2 of the DSU, supra note 28, 11.
57. James, supra note 54, at 2.
58. Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Article 22.2 of the DSU, supra note 28, 12.
59. WTO.org, The Process - Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case, supra
note 47, 10.
60. Id.
61. James, supra note 54, at 2.
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D. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE REMEDY
As a negative reciprocal remedy scheme that was developed in the
1994 Uruguay round, cross-retaliation, like any scheme, is strewn with
potential problems, and has elicited both proponents and critics. Some
scholars dislike retaliation as the foundation for enforcement of free-
trade agreements because it rewards the protectionist groups within the
injured country that oppose free trade rather than rewarding the harmed
exporters. 62 Additionally, retaliation can hurt the injured state's econ-
omy, for instance, by increasing prices or hurting consumers within the
injured country when trade barriers are erected. 63 For opponents of re-
taliatory remedies, one proposed solution is a monetary sanction against
the injuring country.64 The main problem with such sanctions is one of
the reasons why the WTO adopted retaliatory measures in the first place:
unenforceability. 65 In the case at hand, if the WTO sanction against the
United States was purely a monetary penalty, the United States could
simply refuse to comply. Without an escrow system for all member coun-
tries that would amount to a practical impossibility, the WTO would have
no way of ensuring that the violating country would pay the monetary
penalty. 66
Without retaliation, injuring parties have low compliance incentives
and high compliance costs with any trade sanctions granted against it.67
One major benefit of retaliation is that it solves the enforceability prob-
lem with trade sanctions. Once an injured party is allowed to suspend
obligations toward the injuring country, the enforcement of the penalty
has been achieved. But, this is uncharted territory for the WTO in this
case. If Antigua is granted suspension of obligations under TRIPS agree-
ments in order to violate U.S. intellectual property rights, then Antigua's
next move will surely be highly scrutinized by the entire world. If in fact
the country does successfully enforce the trade sanction on the United
States, a huge victory will be won for small countries in terms of trade
negotiating power with larger countries.
Before Antigua moves forward with suspending its obligations under
the TRIPS agreements, if granted permission by the WTO, the country
must balance several countervailing consequences of its actions. Piracy of
intellectual property such as computer software, music, and other media
62. Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in
the World Trade Organization's Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 215, 228 (2005); Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions,
95 AM . J. INT'L L. 792, 815 (2002).(2001).
63. WTO.org, The Process - Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case, supra
note 48, 10.
64. Nzelibe, supra note 62, at 228; Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures
in the WTO: Rules are Rules-Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L
L. 335, 346 (2000).
65. Nzelibe, supra note 62, at 229.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 217.
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may be accompanied by money laundering and terrorism. 68 Antigua cer-
tainly does not want to become a safe haven for money launderers and
terrorists from around the world. And, an even more concrete conse-
quence than the possibility of attracting criminal activity involves Anti-
gua's participation in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). Under the
terms of the CBI, the United States has granted preferential access,
above what is given to other countries with Most Favored Nation (MFN)
status, to several countries in the Caribbean upon several conditions,
which includes the condition that the countries respect U.S. intellectual
property rights.69 Because the CBI is a voluntary association that can be
disavowed by any participating country with regard to any other partici-
pating country at any time, the United States is free to withdraw CBI
protection from Antigua if it seeks to suspend obligations under the
TRIPS agreement.70 The economic consequences of losing this preferen-
tial trade status with the United States surely will weigh heavily on Anti-
gua's decision regarding whether or not to violate U.S. intellectual
property rights, if granted the opportunity to do so.
IV. CONCLUSION
The WTO faces a type of remedy in the Antigua-U.S. gambling case
that has widespread implications for the future of dispute settlement.
Both the panel and the appellate body have passed down findings against
the United States, and a compliance panel further found that the United
States was out of compliance with the WTO rulings.7' An arbitration
report further found that Antigua properly followed the principles and
procedures of the DSU, and may continue seeking authorization to cross-
retaliate.72 Thus, it would seem that some sanctions are due to the
United States.
On the one hand, if the DSB does not allow Antigua to suspend its
obligations under the TRIPS agreement, then Antigua may end up with a
remedy that is more detrimental than helpful. Further, if the United
States continues to be unresponsive to the WTO rulings, then enforce-
ment may become the biggest issue. In order for small countries to be
able to negotiate terms of trade with larger countries, and ensure that
those terms are not broken, the WTO will be stuck trying to force the
United States to comply. On the other hand, if the DSB does allow Anti-
gua to engage in cross-retaliation and violate U.S. intellectual property
rights in response to U.S. violations of the GATS agreement, then the
small country will be forced with deciding how to best act upon the WTO
68. James, supra note 55, at 3.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda: Report of the
Panel, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services, 7.1, WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30, 2007).
72. Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, supra
note 29, 6.1.
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decision. The best-case scenario may seem to be that Antigua settles the
case with the United States, but if the United States remains recalcitrant,
then Antigua will have to take some enforcement action, while trying not
to hurt its own economy in the process. The whole world will be watching
to see how a small country uses a remedy that has never before been
employed.
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